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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Timothy McGee appeals his convictions for 
(1) securities fraud under the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rules 10b-5 
and 10b5-2(b)(2), and (2) perjury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 1621. McGee raises several issues on appeal. He first 
challenges his securities fraud conviction, arguing that Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2) is invalid because it allows for misappropriation 
liability absent a fiduciary relationship between a 
misappropriator of inside information and its source. McGee 
contends also that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his 
convictions, and that the District Court exceeded its discretion 
in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.1  
 
I. 
Between June and July 2008, McGee obtained material 
nonpublic information about the impending sale of 
Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corporation (“PHLY”), a 
publicly traded company, from Christopher Maguire, a PHLY 
insider. Before this information became public, McGee 
borrowed approximately $226,000 at 6.875% interest to 
partially finance the purchase of 10,750 PHLY shares. 
Shortly after the public announcement of PHLY’s sale, 
McGee sold his shares, resulting in a $292,128 profit. 
 
A financial advisor with more than twenty years of 
experience, McGee first met Maguire between 1999 and 2001 
while attending Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings. 
AA is a fellowship of recovering alcoholics who share a 
desire to stop drinking. AA members are encouraged to seek 
                                              
1 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. We review the facts in 
the “light most favorable to the prosecution.” Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
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support from other members in their efforts to stay sober. As 
a newcomer to AA, Maguire sought support from McGee, 
who shared similar interests and had successfully achieved 
sobriety for many years.   
 
For the better part of a decade, McGee informally 
mentored Maguire in AA. Though the two biked and 
competed in triathlons together, sobriety was “the primary 
purpose” of their relationship. J.A. 109-110. To achieve this 
purpose, they shared intimate details about their lives to 
alleviate stress and prevent relapses. Given the sensitive 
nature of their communications, McGee assured Maguire that 
their conversations were going to remain private. Likewise, 
Maguire never repeated information that McGee entrusted to 
him. This comported to the general practice in AA, where a 
“newcomer can turn . . . with the assurance that no newfound 
friends will violate confidences relating to his or her drinking 
problem.” Amicus Curiae Br. Supporting Appellant at 12 
(quoting Alcoholics Anonymous World Servs., Inc., 44 
Questions 11 (2008)). McGee encouraged Maguire to use his 
services as an investment adviser, telling Maguire, “I know 
everything about what you’re going through from an alcohol 
perspective. You can keep your trust in me.” J.A. 112. 
Maguire repeatedly declined McGee’s offers. 
 
In early 2008, Maguire was closely involved in 
negotiations to sell PHLY. During this time, Maguire 
experienced sporadic alcohol relapses, culminating in a 
drinking episode a week or two after June 21-22, 2008 at a 
weekend golf event. Shortly after the golf event, Maguire 
recommenced his regular AA attendance. McGee saw 
Maguire after a meeting and inquired about his frequent 
absences. In response, Maguire “blurted out” the inside 
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information about PHLY’s imminent sale. J.A. 133. He told 
McGee, “Listen, we’re selling the company. . . . for three 
times book [value]. We are selling it for 61.50. [T]here’s a lot 
of pressure. There’s just a lot of things going on, and I’m not 
dealing with it well.” J.A. 133. He testified that he expected 
McGee to keep this information confidential. At the time, the 
sale had not been publicly announced and Maguire “had not 
said a word to anybody.” J.A. 135. He believed he could trust 
McGee with the information given their long history of 
sharing confidences related to sobriety.  
 
After this conversation, McGee purchased a substantial 
amount of PHLY stock on borrowed funds without disclosing 
to Maguire his intent to use the inside information:  
 
On June 30, 2008, PHLY stock represented one-
tenth of McGee’s stock portfolio. Less than a 
month later, it constituted 60% of his holdings. 
In the interim period, McGee made the following 
purchases: July 15, 2008, 1,000 shares at $33 per 
share; July 17, 2008, 8,250 shares at $33 per 
share; July 18, 2008, 1,000 shares at $34 per 
share; and July 22, 2008, 500 shares at $35 per 
share. On July 23, 2008, after the announcement 
of the sale, the stock price rose to $58 per 
share. . . . To finance his purchase of the 8,250 
shares on July 17, 2008, he borrowed 
approximately $226,000, at 6.875% interest. 
United States v. McGee, 955 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (E.D. Pa. 
2013) (footnotes omitted).  
 
Shortly after the sale was publicly announced, the SEC 
commenced an investigation into McGee’s unusually high 
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volume of trades in PHLY stock. On September 16, 2009, 
McGee gave sworn testimony before the SEC stating that he 
“knew nothing” about the impending sale of PHLY before he 
purchased the stock in July 2008. J.A. 53-54, 1630-1633. On 
May 10, 2012, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment 
charging McGee with (1) securities fraud under the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading in violation of 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rules 
10b-5 and 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2), and (2) perjury in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1621. McGee moved to dismiss the indictment 
contending that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) is invalid. He argued 
that the rule conflicts with Supreme Court precedent because 
it allows for misappropriation liability absent a fiduciary 
relationship between a misappropriator and his source. The 
District Court denied his motion, holding that Supreme Court 
precedent does not conflict with or unambiguously foreclose 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2).  
 
On November 15, 2012, a jury found McGee guilty of 
both counts. As to the securities fraud count, the jury found 
that his trades violated a relationship of trust or confidence 
with Maguire based on their “history, pattern, or practice of 
sharing confidences” pursuant to Rule 10b5-2(b)(2).2 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2). McGee moved for a judgment of 
acquittal or a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence as to both convictions. He filed also a supplemental 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
The District Court denied both motions. McGee timely 
appeals. 
                                              
2 Although the indictment charged McGee under both 
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), the District Court only 
instructed the jury as to subsection (b)(2). J.A. 446-450. 
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McGee renews his arguments on appeal, first 
contending that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) exceeds the SEC’s 
rulemaking authority under § 10(b). Second, he argues that 
there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for 
securities fraud and perjury. Finally, he argues that the 
District Court exceeded its discretion in denying his motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We will 
address each argument in turn. Because we determine none to 
be persuasive, we will affirm.  
 
II. 
A. 
To determine whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) exceeds the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority, we begin with the language of 
the enabling statute. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 
1934 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange-- 
. . . 
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.  
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15 U.S.C. § 78j (emphasis added). The SEC acted on this 
broad delegation of rulemaking authority by promulgating 
Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, to 
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or to 
“engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Supreme Court has 
recognized two complementary theories of insider trading 
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: the “traditional” and 
“misappropriation” theories.    
 
Traditional insider trading occurs “when a corporate 
insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis 
of material, nonpublic information.” United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-652 (1997). Such trading 
constitutes a deceptive device under § 10(b) because the 
insider violates a “relationship of trust and confidence” with 
his shareholders by trading on nonpublic information learned 
as a company insider. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 228 (1980). The insider’s position imposes a duty to 
either abstain from trading or disclose the inside information 
to the investors with whom he trades. Id. 
 
In contrast, misappropriation focuses on deceptive 
trading by outsiders who owe no duty to shareholders. It 
occurs when a person “misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty [to disclose] owed to the source of the information.” 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added). If the trader 
discloses to the source his intent to trade, there is no 
deception and no § 10(b) liability. Id. at 655. The Court first 
recognized the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan, in which 
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a lawyer traded in a company’s securities after learning that 
his firm’s client was planning a takeover of the company. 521 
U.S. at 652. Because he was an outsider to the target 
company, the lawyer could not be liable for traditional insider 
trading. Id. at 653 n.5. He could nevertheless be held liable 
for misappropriation because he violated a duty to disclose to 
his client and firm, the sources of the information. Id. at 655, 
659.  
 
Deception through nondisclosure, therefore, is the crux 
of insider trading liability. Id. at 654. In two seminal 
traditional insider trading cases, the Supreme Court rejected  
what is known as the parity-of-information rule, which would 
impose “a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; see also Dirks v. 
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).3 These cases emphasized that 
a duty to disclose is premised on “a specific relationship 
between two parties” rather than on the mere possession of 
inside information. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; Dirks, 463 
U.S. at 657-658. Accordingly, under either theory, “there can 
be no fraud absent a duty to speak,” and the duty to speak 
                                              
3 In Chiarella, the Court reversed the conviction of a print-
shop employee who traded securities of takeover targets he 
deduced from print materials because he did not share a 
fiduciary or similar relationship with the targets’ 
shareholders. 445 U.S. at 224-225, 235. Similarly, in Dirks, 
an investment analyst was not liable for tipping his clients 
about a company’s fraud because “[t]here was no expectation 
by [the analyst’s inside] sources that he would keep their 
information in confidence.” 463 U.S. at 665. 
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arises from a “relationship of trust and confidence.” Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 230, 235.    
 
The Supreme Court has provided limited guidance on 
which relationships between a trader and his source give rise 
to a duty to disclose for misappropriation. In O’Hagan, the 
Court suggested that only “recognized dut[ies]” will suffice. 
521 U.S. at 666. However, the Court did not otherwise limit 
or define the contours of such relationships. See id. at 652-
655; SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2010). 
Accordingly, after O’Hagan, it remained unclear which 
nonfiduciary relationships carried a duty to disclose to the 
source. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). 
Prompted by inconsistent treatment among lower courts,4 the 
SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 “to clarify and enhance” the 
misappropriation theory in light of O’Hagan. Proposed Rule, 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 
72,590, 72,590 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter 
Proposed Rule] (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b5-2). Rule 10b5-2 identifies three nonexhaustive 
categories of relationships that give rise to a duty to disclose 
for misappropriation liability:  
                                              
4 Compare United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (holding that there was no duty of confidentiality 
between members of a social group of CEOs although club 
rules emphasized a need for confidentiality), with SEC v. 
Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding such 
duties existed between members of a group of software 
executives because the need for confidentiality was 
understood). 
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[A] “duty of trust or confidence” exists in the 
following circumstances, among others: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence;  
 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the 
material nonpublic information and the person 
to whom it is communicated have a history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such 
that the recipient of the information knows or 
reasonably should know that the person 
communicating the material nonpublic 
information expects that the recipient will 
maintain its confidentiality; or 
 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains 
material nonpublic information from his or her 
spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, 
however, that the person receiving or obtaining 
the information may demonstrate that no duty 
of trust or confidence existed with respect to the 
information . . . .  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b).  
 
Because McGee’s conviction stems only from 
subsection (b)(2), we will discuss solely that portion of the 
rule. As a matter of first impression, we decide whether Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2) exceeds the SEC’s rulemaking authority under 
§ 10(b). 
 
B. 
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We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
legal conclusions. United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594 
(3d Cir. 2012). We review the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) 
under the familiar two-step Chevron deference framework. 
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). At step one, we ask if “the 
[enabling] statute is silent or ambiguous” on “the precise 
question at issue.” Id. at 843. If we answer in the affirmative, 
we turn to step two and uphold the rule if it is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” Id.  
 
The Supreme Court has clarified that a “prior judicial 
construction of a statute trumps [a later] agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). We 
thereby “hold judicial interpretations contained in precedents 
to the same demanding Chevron step one standard that 
applies if the court is reviewing the agency’s construction on 
a blank slate.” Id. 
 
McGee argues that we are foreclosed from applying 
the teachings of Chevron to Rule 10b5-2(b)(2). He first 
contends that § 10(b) unambiguously requires deception. 
McGee then argues that, under Supreme Court precedent, 
deception through nondisclosure requires the breach of a 
fiduciary duty, leaving no room for Rule 10b5-2(b)(2). We 
disagree and hold that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is valid and entitled 
to Chevron deference because it (1) has not been 
congressionally or judicially foreclosed, and (2) is based on a 
permissible reading of § 10(b). We address each step in turn. 
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1. 
At Chevron step one, we decide that § 10(b) is 
ambiguous and expressly delegates broad rulemaking 
authority to the SEC. Section 10(b) acts as a catch-all 
provision and authorizes the SEC to “prescribe [regulations] 
as necessary or appropriate” to prevent the use of 
“manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection with 
trading securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). McGee’s contention 
that § 10(b) “unambiguously requires deception” misses the 
point. Appellant’s Br. at 25. The statute is ambiguous because 
Congress declined to define the amorphous term “deceptive 
device.” Moreover, Congress did not speak to the “precise 
question at issue” because § 10(b) does not mention insider 
trading at all, much less misappropriation or relationships 
required for liability. This congressional omission constitutes 
a delegation of authority to the SEC to “fill the statutory gap 
in reasonable fashion.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. The SEC 
filled this gap with Rule 10b5-2.  
 
Having identified the gap in § 10(b), we turn to 
McGee’s argument that Supreme Court precedent forecloses 
us from applying Chevron’s framework to Rule 10b5-2(b)(2). 
We do not accept this argument. The Court has recognized 
that “allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency 
from interpreting an ambiguous statute . . . would allow a 
court’s interpretation to override an agency’s.” Id. at 982. 
“Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill 
statutory gaps.” Id. Hence, it bears reemphasis that “[o]nly a 
judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously 
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains 
no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency 
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construction.” Id. at 982-983. Our review of insider trading 
case law reveals no such authority.  
 
First, we reject McGee’s contention that Rule 10b5-
2(b)(2) conflicts with the Supreme Court’s insider trading 
jurisprudence. According to McGee, O’Hagan expressly 
requires a fiduciary relationship between a misappropriator 
and the source of inside information for liability.5 McGee 
further argues that O’Hagan cannot be read in a vacuum, but 
is constrained by virtue of the Court’s earlier traditional 
insider trading cases. McGee contends that Chiarella and its 
progeny require a fiduciary relationship for both theories of 
§ 10(b) nondisclosure liability. Because Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) 
requires only a “history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences,” McGee argues that it impermissibly expands 
the Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine. We are 
unpersuaded.  
 
Contrary to McGee’s contention, Supreme Court 
precedent does not unequivocally require a fiduciary duty for 
all § 10(b) nondisclosure liability. In O’Hagan, though the 
defendant’s duty to disclose undoubtedly arose from his 
position as a fiduciary, the Court stressed that 
misappropriation liability extends to “those who breach a 
recognized duty.” 521 U.S. at 645, 666. The Court did not 
                                              
5 In McGee’s motion to dismiss the indictment, he conceded 
that O’Hagan “did not elaborate on the requisite relationship 
giving rise to the duty and deception.” United States v. 
McGee, 892 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting 
McGee Mem. at 6). On appeal, McGee changes course, 
insisting that O’Hagan requires a fiduciary duty.  
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unambiguously define recognized duties or cabin such duties 
to fiduciary relationships. The Court painted with a broader 
brush, referring to the requisite relationship as a “fiduciary or 
other similar relationship,” an “agency or other fiduciary 
relationship,” a “duty of loyalty and confidentiality,” and a 
“duty of trust and confidence.” See id. at 652-661 (citations 
omitted). We will not assign a meaning to “recognized 
dut[ies]” that the Court did not acknowledge. We therefore 
perceive no conflict between O’Hagan’s language and Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2). 
 
The Supreme Court’s traditional insider trading 
precedent does not change this result. Chiarella and Dirks call 
for a “specific relationship between two parties.” Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 233; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-658. Although these 
cases often referred to fiduciaries, they spoke also in broader 
terms. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (explaining that for 
traditional insider trading, there is no duty to disclose if the 
trader is not an agent, a fiduciary, or “a person in whom the 
sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and 
confidence” (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232)). Even 
assuming arguendo that Chiarella and Dirks require a strict 
fiduciary duty for traditional insider trading, neither case 
considered the misappropriation theory. In O’Hagan, the 
Court examined these cases and opted to extend 
misappropriation beyond solely fiduciaries. 521 U.S. at 645, 
666. We decline to infer from Chiarella and Dirks a 
restriction on misappropriation that the O’Hagan Court did 
not itself recognize.  
 
We join our sister circuits in recognizing that the 
Supreme Court “did not set the contours of a relationship of 
‘trust and confidence’ giving rise to the duty to disclose or 
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abstain and misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 
555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that 
after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled 
whether non-business relationships . . . provide the duty of 
loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the 
misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a 
duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a 
history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not 
conflict with Supreme Court precedent.6  
 
Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the 
Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not 
purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. 
See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (holding that to 
foreclose a conflicting agency interpretation, a “prior court 
                                              
6 We recognize that some courts have more narrowly defined 
duty-bearing relationships than others. Before O’Hagan, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
misappropriation requires a fiduciary relationship or its 
“functional equivalent,” which the court narrowly defined as 
a relationship sharing “the essential characteristics of a 
fiduciary association.” United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 
551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc, 5-4 decision). However, 
after O’Hagan, both the SEC and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected Chestman’s narrow 
holding because it did not “sufficiently protect investors,” 
Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,602, and it “too narrowly 
defined the circumstances in which a duty . . . is created,” 
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272. As we hold here, deference is owed to 
the SEC’s interpretation.  
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decision [must hold] that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute”). Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the text of § 10(b) is ambiguous. 
See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (“[Section] 10(b) does 
not state whether [or when] silence may constitute a 
manipulative or deceptive device. . . . [and] neither the 
legislative history nor the statute itself affords specific 
guidance . . . .”). In short, the Supreme Court simply has not 
held that misappropriation requires a fiduciary relationship or 
that its interpretation follows from the unambiguous terms of 
§ 10(b).7 Accordingly, we turn to step two of Chevron. 
 
2. 
“Under step two of the Chevron framework, we 
consider whether the [SEC’s] interpretation is reasonable in 
light of the language, policies, and legislative history” of 
§ 10(b) and the Exchange Act of 1934 as a whole. GenOn 
REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2013) 
                                              
7 McGee’s reliance on United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), is also misplaced. 
There, an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous I.R.C. 
provision was not entitled to Chevron deference when a prior 
court had determined that Congress’s intent was clear and 
“decided the question definitively, leaving no room for the 
agency.” Id. at 1844. In contrast, O’Hagan did not definitively 
decide the question of relationships bearing a duty to disclose, 
leaving no room for the SEC. Unlike the I.R.C. provision in 
Home Concrete, § 10(b) and its legislative history 
demonstrate that the statute is flexible by design. S. Rep. 73-
792, at 5 (1934) (“[S]o delicate a mechanism as the modern 
stock exchange cannot be regulated efficiently under a rigid 
statutory program.”).  
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(citation omitted). We “need not conclude that the agency 
construction was the only one it permissibly could have 
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the 
court would have reached.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
“Rules represent important policy decisions, and should not 
be disturbed if ‘this choice represents a reasonable 
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to 
the agency’s care by the statute . . . .’” Swallows, 515 F.3d at 
171 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). We are mindful that 
§ 10(b) should be “construed not technically and restrictively, 
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” SEC v. 
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 
Here, Congress implemented the Exchange Act “to 
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in 
[securities] transactions.” 15 U.S.C. § 78b. The legislative 
history demonstrates that § 10(b) was aimed at 
“any . . . manipulative or deceptive practices which [the SEC] 
finds detrimental to the interests of the investor.” S. Rep. No. 
73-792, at 18 (1934) (emphasis added). Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) 
targets a misappropriator who deceives his source by trading 
on confidential information notwithstanding the parties’ 
“history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b). The SEC explained “that in some 
circumstances a past pattern of conduct between two parties 
will lead to a legitimate, reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality on the part of the confiding person.” Proposed 
Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,603. 
 
We agree with the analysis in United States v. Corbin, 
which held that the SEC’s broader approach was reasonable 
and “buttressed by a thorough and careful 
19 
 
consideration . . . of the ends of § 10(b), the state of the 
current insider trading case law” and “the need to protect 
investors and the market.” 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 619 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). Like misappropriation generally, subsection 
(b)(2) “trains on conduct involving manipulation or 
deception” and proscribes “feigning fidelity to the source of 
the information.” See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. A trader’s 
“undisclosed, self-serving use,” id. at 652, of confidential 
information notwithstanding the parties’ history of sharing 
confidences chills market participation because it “‘stems 
from contrivance, not luck,’ and the informational 
disadvantage to other investors ‘cannot be overcome with 
research or skill.’” Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,603 
(quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-659). Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) 
provides a basis to hold such misappropriators accountable. 
Subsection (b)(2) thus is “well tuned to an animating purpose 
of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and 
thereby promote investor confidence.” See O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. at 658 (citation omitted).8    
 
                                              
8 The SEC was emboldened by Congress’s enactment of “two 
separate laws providing enhanced penalties for insider 
trading,” which the SEC viewed as an endorsement of its 
regulatory efforts. Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,599-
72,600 (citations omitted). Likewise, we note that Rule 10b5-
2(b)(2) has been in effect since October 23, 2000. See Final 
Rule, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 
51,716, 51,716 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)). In the 
intervening time, Congress has not altered the SEC’s 
interpretation.  
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We believe that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is based on a 
permissible reading of “deceptive device[s]” under § 10(b). 
Although we are not without reservations concerning the 
breadth of misappropriation under Rule 105b-2(b)(2), it is for 
Congress to limit its delegation of authority to the SEC or to 
limit misappropriation by statute. It is not the role of our 
Court, “even if the agency’s reading differs from what the 
court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” See Brand 
X, 545 U.S. at 980.9 
 
C. 
We hold that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is a valid exercise of 
the SEC’s rulemaking authority. The rule is owed Chevron 
deference because it has not been congressionally or 
judicially foreclosed and is “based on a permissible reading” 
of § 10(b). 
 
III. 
McGee argues also that the District Court erred by 
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial 
because insufficient evidence supports his convictions for 
securities fraud and perjury. Our review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence is “highly deferential.” United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc). The verdict must be upheld if “after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
                                              
9 Like the Court in O’Hagan, we are reassured by the added 
protection for criminal liability under § 10(b), which requires 
that misappropriators knowingly and willfully violate the law. 
521 U.S. at 665-666. 
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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 
319 (emphasis in original). 
 
A. 
McGee first challenges his securities fraud conviction. 
He argues that no rational trier of fact could have found that 
(1) McGee and Maguire had the requisite relationship of trust 
or confidence for misappropriation liability, or (2) the inside 
information was disclosed within the scope of such a 
relationship. But McGee cannot overcome the “highly 
deferential” standard of review for sufficiency of the 
evidence. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430.  
 
A person is liable for misappropriation when he 
“misappropriates confidential information for securities 
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of 
the information.” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. Under Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2), a duty to disclose to the source exists when 
there is a “history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, 
such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably 
should know” that the person communicating the information 
expects it to be kept confidential. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-
2(b)(2). The SEC explicitly rejected limiting liability to those 
who share “business confidences.” Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 72,603. The SEC instead favored a facts-and-
circumstances test and noted that the type of confidences 
historically shared between parties could be a relevant factor. 
Id.10  
                                              
10 Because we owe deference to the rule as codified, we reject 
McGee’s argument that a business relationship is required for 
misappropriation.  
 
22 
 
 
We reject McGee’s argument that he did not share a 
relationship of trust or confidence with Maguire. McGee 
contends that membership in AA alone does not generate a 
duty of trust or confidence and his relationship with Maguire 
did not bear the hallmark indicators of a confidential 
relationship. McGee characterizes their relationship as purely 
social, limited to “occasional bike rides and sporadic AA 
meetings.” Appellant’s Br. at 31, 35. He argues this social 
affiliation is insufficient to impose a duty to disclose under 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(2). We disagree.   
 
Even assuming there is no expectation of 
confidentiality generally in AA,11 the plain language of Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2) requires a “history, pattern, or practice of 
sharing confidences” between the two parties. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b5-2(b)(2). Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s 
                                              
11 Amicus on behalf of McGee cites an exposition published 
by AA’s General Service Office for the proposition that AA 
is premised on the “anonymity” of its members and not 
“confidentiality.” Amicus Curiae Br. Supporting Appellant at 
12-13. But the AA materials cited by Amicus include broader 
language. Amicus cites to an AA publication stating that a 
“newcomer can turn to A.A. with the assurance that no 
newfound friends will violate confidences relating to his or 
her drinking problem.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). This language is not limited to a member’s 
anonymity. Moreover, evidence at trial indicated that AA 
members were cautioned that “what you hear here, stays 
here.” J.A. 111. Although this undermines McGee’s 
argument, a finding that AA requires confidentiality is not 
necessary to our holding.  
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finding that such a pattern existed. For almost a decade, 
McGee informally mentored Maguire, who entrusted 
“extremely personal” information to McGee to alleviate stress 
associated with alcohol relapses. J.A. 109-110. 
Confidentiality was not just Maguire’s unilateral hope; it was 
the parties’ expectation. It was their “understanding” that 
information discussed would not be disclosed or used by 
either party. J.A. 112. Maguire never repeated information 
that McGee revealed to him and McGee assured Maguire that 
their discussions were going to remain private. Furthermore, 
McGee encouraged Maguire to use his services as an 
investment adviser, telling Maguire, “I know everything 
about what you’re going through from an alcohol perspective. 
You can keep your trust in me.” J.A. 112. From this evidence, 
a rational juror could find that a relationship of trust or 
confidence existed based on the parties’ history, pattern or 
practice of sharing confidences related to sobriety. 
 
We reject also McGee’s argument that the inside 
information about PHLY’s sale exceeded the scope of any 
confidential relationship related to sobriety. Shortly following 
Maguire’s relapse, McGee saw him at an AA meeting. After 
the meeting, McGee asked Maguire about his inconsistent AA 
attendance. In response, Maguire told McGee, his confidant, 
that the impending sale of PHLY was a source of high stress 
and that he was not dealing well with the pressure. McGee, a 
savvy investment advisor, feigned fidelity to Maguire and did 
not disclose his intent to use the information to his pecuniary 
advantage by trading in PHLY. Accordingly, McGee’s 
inquiry and Maguire’s disclosure of PHLY’s impending sale 
related directly to their confidential relationship. 
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Ultimately, we agree with the District Court, which 
held that “[t]here was sufficient evidence from which a 
rational fact finder could have found that a confidential 
relationship existed and the inside information was disclosed 
within the confines of that relationship.” McGee, 955 F. 
Supp. 2d at 470. Accordingly, we will affirm McGee’s 
conviction for securities fraud.   
 
B. 
McGee next challenges his perjury conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 1621 based on his sworn testimony on September 
16, 2009 before the SEC. Under oath, McGee denied 
knowing any information about the sale of PHLY before he 
purchased the company’s stock in July 2008.12 McGee 
                                              
12 The charge in the indictment recited the following colloquy 
regarding McGee’s perjury charge: 
Q: [SEC attorney] Did you have any information prior 
to making your purchases in Philadelphia Consolidated 
in July of ’08 that there might be something afoot at 
the company, that there might be something happening 
with the stock? 
A: [McGee] No. 
Q: You didn’t get a feeling from anyone that there was 
some activity, maybe [PHLY executives] weren’t at a 
certain event that they were always at and you thought 
something might be going on, that they were busy? 
A: No, there was nothing like that. . . . 
Q: Any other events that you recall in let’s say—
beginning in maybe March of ’08 going forward? 
A: March of ’08? 
Q: Anything from that time forward till you bought? 
A: No. 
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contends that his perjury conviction must be overturned 
because (1) Maguire’s testimony was uncorroborated and (2) 
there was insufficient evidence that McGee’s statements were 
false. We find neither argument to be persuasive.  
 
                                                                                                     
Q: How about any contacts, do you recall having any 
conversations or contacts with [PHLY executives]? 
A: Oh, I talked to [Maguire], you know, just checked 
in with him. Made sure he was doing alright in our 
common deal. There’s a certain amount of our 
conversations that kind of revolve around that bike 
environment. 
Q: In any of these interactions that you had with him 
during that time frame, did you ever sense or pick up 
any type of information or queue [sic] that would 
suggest that the company was going to be purchased? 
A: I did not. 
Q: Was there any rumors going on that you heard 
about the company being bought that led you to 
purchase the stock in July? 
A: No. I knew nothing. I mean there was not a factor. 
Q: And there’s no indication from any of the family 
members, generic or otherwise, to suggest to you to 
purchase the stock, whether it not be specific about 
whether you bought out, but any other indications to 
you that it might be a good time to buy the stock? 
A: If there were, it was so generic that I didn’t pick up 
on it. I mean I did not pick up on anything. I did not 
recognize any comment that made me take pause to 
think. 
J.A. 52-54 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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1. 
A perjury conviction under § 1621 cannot be obtained 
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, but 
must be based on “the testimony of two independent 
witnesses or by one witness and corroborating evidence.” 
United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 306 (3d Cir. 1954). 
Evidence corroborating the testimony of a single witness 
must be independent of the witness’s testimony, trustworthy 
enough to convince the jury that what the witness said was 
true, and be “inconsistent with the innocence of the 
defendant.” Id. at 307. To be inconsistent with innocence, 
corroborating evidence must “merely support the inference 
that the defendant was lying.” United States v. Nessanbaum, 
205 F.2d 93, 95 n.4 (3d Cir. 1953). 
 
At trial, the Government offered McGee’s high-
volume trading in PHLY stock to corroborate Maguire’s 
testimony that he told McGee about PHLY’s sale before it 
was publicly announced. McGee contends that his trading 
records are not sufficient corroborative evidence. McGee 
points to United States v. Chestman, in which the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a perjury conviction 
because the evidence of trading was not inconsistent with the 
defendant’s “position that he researched the company, 
assumed it was a takeover target, and invested accordingly.” 
903 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds en 
banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). McGee argues that, like 
the defendant in Chestman, his trading records are insufficient 
corroborative evidence because there are other explanations 
for his excessive trading.  
 
McGee contends that his trades are congruous with his 
investment strategy of “averaging down.” Averaging down 
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“occurs when an investor . . . buys additional stock at a price 
lower than the initial investment, which reduces the average 
price per share of the total investment.” McGee, 955 F. Supp. 
2d at 472 n.12.  McGee contends that because PHLY’s stock 
price at the time of his July trades was lower than the price at 
which he had previously purchased the stock, his trading was 
“not inconsistent with his innocence.” Appellant’s Br. at 46. 
McGee additionally cites a “historic and significant spike in 
volume” near the time of his trades, which would encourage 
increased investor holdings. Id. For these reasons, McGee 
argues his trading alone fails to independently establish 
perjury because there were innocent motives for his trades. 
 
We agree with the District Court that McGee’s trading 
records constitute independent corroborating evidence and 
that “[t]he jury obviously rejected [McGee’s averaging-down] 
argument.” McGee, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 472. Unlike in 
Chestman, in which the defendant’s trading was consistent 
with his position that he researched the company and invested 
accordingly, McGee’s high-volume trades were anomalous 
and inconsistent with an averaging-down strategy. McGee did 
not engage in similar trading activity during prior periods of 
low PHLY stock prices. Yet, in the weeks preceding PHLY’s 
sale, McGee increased his holdings in PHLY from 10 percent 
of his portfolio on June 30, 2008 to 60 percent by July 23, 
2008, the date PHLY’s sale was publicly announced. 
Moreover, there is scant evidence McGee knew about a 
“historic and significant spike in volume” or that he would 
increase his holdings in PHLY so appreciably based on such a 
trading spike. As the District Court held, “[t]he unusual 
timing and the large number of the shares purchased within a 
three-week period of time when compared to his previous 
holdings in PHLY stock, and the significant loan he took to 
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purchase the stock is [sufficient] corroborative evidence.” Id. 
Accordingly, we reject McGee’s argument that his trading 
records do not corroborate Maguire’s testimony. 
 
2. 
McGee next contends that there was insufficient 
evidence that his sworn statements were false. McGee first 
claims that Maguire’s inability to recall the precise date he 
told McGee about the sale demonstrates that McGee’s 
answers denying knowledge of the sale when he traded could 
have been true. Next, McGee selectively points to specific 
questions asked of him under oath to show that each is 
ambiguous and the corresponding answers were literally true. 
McGee again cannot overcome the “highly deferential” 
standard of review for sufficiency of evidence as to the falsity 
of his statements. See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430.  
 
We do not agree that Maguire’s testimony was unclear. 
Maguire plainly testified that he disclosed PHLY’s sale 
before McGee’s suspicious July trades. Maguire testified that 
a week or two after June 21-22, 2008, he attended a weekend 
golf tournament where he drank. Maguire further testified that 
right after the golf tournament, he recommenced his AA 
attendance and told McGee about the sale after a meeting. 
Though Maguire did not point to an exact date, his testimony 
indicates that he disclosed the information within the first two 
weeks of July 2008, before McGee’s first purchase of PHLY 
stock on the evening of July 14, 2008. Maguire’s testimony 
therefore directly contradicts McGee’s sworn statement 
before the SEC that he did not have any inside information 
“prior to making [his] purchases in Philadelphia Consolidated 
in July of ’08.” J.A. 52. The jury was free to accept or reject 
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Maguire’s testimony, which was not so unclear as to 
invalidate McGee’s perjury conviction. 
 
We reject also McGee’s argument that the SEC’s 
questions were ambiguous. “Precise questioning is imperative 
as a predicate for the offense of perjury.” Bronston v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). However, our Court has 
“eschew[ed] a broad reading of Bronston,” noting instead 
that, “[a]s a general rule, the fact that there is some ambiguity 
in a falsely answered question will not shield the respondent 
from a perjury or false statements prosecution.” United States 
v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1416 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United 
States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987)).  
 
We agree with the District Court, which held that 
although some questions were imprecise, they were not so 
ambiguous that McGee’s answers were literally true. McGee 
was specifically asked, “Did you have any information prior 
to making your purchases in [PHLY] in July of ’08 that there 
might be something afoot at the company, that there might be 
something happening with the stock?” J.A. 52. McGee 
responded, “No.” J.A. 52. McGee makes much of the word 
“afoot,” arguing that its implication of mischief or trouble 
makes his answer literally true. Appellant’s Br. at 54. McGee 
strains to find ambiguity in the question. Read in its entirety, 
the question asks whether McGee had any information 
concerning PHLY stock in July. McGee’s express denial 
cannot be characterized as literally true.  
 
McGee’s efforts to find ambiguity in other questions 
are similarly flawed. McGee was asked, “W[ere] there any 
rumors going on that you heard about [PHLY] being bought 
that led you to purchase the stock in July?” J.A. 53. McGee 
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answered, “No. I knew nothing.” J.A. 54. McGee was 
additionally asked, “In any of these interactions [with 
Maguire] during that time frame, did you ever sense or pick 
up any type of information . . . that would suggest that the 
company was going to be purchased?” J.A. 53. McGee 
answered, “I did not.” J.A. 53. McGee argues that the words 
“rumors” and “sense” relate to gossip and intuition, not 
whether anyone directly told him about the sale. We do not 
accept McGee’s contrived interpretation of the SEC’s 
questions and determine that McGee’s unequivocal answer 
that he “knew nothing” was clearly false. The questions asked 
by the SEC were not so ambiguous as to render McGee’s 
answers literally true.  
 
3. 
We hold that Maguire’s testimony was corroborated 
and there was sufficient evidence to support the falsity of 
McGee’s statements under oath. Accordingly, we will affirm 
McGee’s perjury conviction.  
 
IV. 
Finally, McGee contends that he is entitled to a new 
trial based on a newly discovered affidavit. We review the 
denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 390 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Under Rule 33, “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court 
may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest 
of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Five requirements 
must be met to justify a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence: 
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(a) the evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, 
i.e. discovered since trial; (b) facts must be alleged 
from which the court may infer diligence on the 
part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on must 
not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it 
must be material to the issues involved; and (e) it 
must be such, and of such nature, [that the 
evidence] would probably produce an acquittal.  
Quiles, 618 F.3d at 388-389 (quoting United States v. 
Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 2000)). To warrant a 
new trial based on impeachment evidence, there must be 
“a factual link between the heart of the witness’s 
testimony at trial and the new evidence” and “[t]his link 
must suggest directly that the defendant was convicted 
wrongly.” Id. at 392 (citation omitted). 
 
McGee argues that a new trial is warranted based on 
an affidavit by Tyler D., which came to light during civil 
discovery after his criminal conviction. He maintains that he 
was previously unable to find a witness willing to deny that 
the statement “what you hear here, stays here” was made at 
the AA meetings he and Maguire attended. Appellant’s Br. at 
40. McGee contends that this evidence would rebut the 
existence of a relationship of trust or confidence related to 
AA and “surely would produce an acquittal.” Id.  
 
McGee fails to meet the five requirements for a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence. First, he fails to 
explain what diligence he used to procure Tyler D.’s 
testimony although he has known Tyler D. and attended AA 
with him since 2005. Tyler D. actually testified on behalf of 
McGee at his criminal sentencing, yet McGee fails to clarify 
why he did not offer Tyler D.’s testimony at trial before 
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sentencing. Additionally, the affidavit does not “suggest 
directly that the defendant was convicted wrongly” or attack 
the heart of Maguire’s testimony. Quiles 618 F.3d at 392. As 
noted above, even if confidentiality is not a tenet of AA, Rule 
10b5-2(b)(2) requires only a “history, pattern, or practice” of 
sharing confidences between the two parties. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b5-2(b)(2). Tyler D.’s affidavit disputing what was 
said at AA meetings does not undermine Maguire’s testimony 
detailing his confidential relationship with McGee related to 
sobriety. The District Court therefore acted well within its 
discretion in holding that the affidavit did not warrant a new 
trial. 
 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm. Rule 10b5-
2(b)(2) warrants Chevron deference and is based on a 
permissible reading of § 10(b). Moreover, a rational juror 
could find that McGee and Maguire had a relationship of trust 
or confidence based on their history, pattern or practice of 
sharing confidences related to sobriety to support a conviction 
for securities fraud. In addition, there was sufficient evidence 
to support a perjury conviction, and the District Court did not 
exceed permissible discretion in denying McGee’s motion for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  
 
* * * * * 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  
 
